The Army aviation community has always counted on well-trained U.S. Army helicopter mechanics to maintain Army aircraft. Unfortunately, a problem exists with too many maintenance man-hour (MMH) requirements and too few MMH available (Nelms, 2014, p. 1) . This disconnect between the amount of maintenance capability available and the amount of maintenance capability required to keep the aircraft flying results in an MMH gap, which can lead to decreased readiness levels and increased mission risk.
In order to mitigate this MMH gap, commanders have hired contractors to augment soldier maintainers and increase the amount of maintenance performed on aircraft for many years (Evans, 1997, p. 15) . This MMH gap can be driven by many reasons, among them an inadequate number of soldier maintainers assigned to aviation units, inefficient use of assigned soldier maintainers, and political pressures to reduce the size of the soldier footprint during deployments. Regardless of the reason for the MMH gap, the Army's primary challenge is not managing the cost of the fleet or flying hour program, but achieving the associated maintenance challenge and managing the MMH gap to ensure mission success.
The purposes of this exploratory article are to: (a) confirm a current MMH gap exists; (b) determine the likely future MMH gap; (c) confirm any requirement for contractor support needed by the acquisition, program management, and force structure communities; and (d) prototype a tool that could simplify and standardize calculation of the MMH gap and provide a decision support tool that could support MMH gap-related trade-off analyses at any level of organization.
Background
The number of soldier maintainers assigned to a unit is driven by its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). These MTOEs are designed for wartime maintenance requirements, but the peacetime environment is different-and in many cases, more taxing on the maintenance force. There is a base maintenance requirement even if the aircraft are not flown; however, many peacetime soldier training tasks and off-duty
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distractions significantly reduce the amount of time soldier maintainers are actually available to work on aircraft (Kokenes, 1987, p. 9) . Another MTOE-related issue contributing to the MMH gap is that increasing aircraft complexity stresses existing maintenance capabilities, and MTOEs are not always updated to address these changes in MMH requirements in a timely manner. Modern rotary wing aircraft are many times more complex than their predecessors of only a few years ago and more difficult to maintain. (Keirsey, 1992, p. 2) . In 1991, Army aircraft required upwards of 10 man-hours of maintenance time for every flight hour (McClellan, 1991, p. 31) , while today the average is over 16 man-hours for every flight hour.
The greatest resource available to the aviation commander is the time assigned soldier maintainers are actually turning wrenches on their aircraft. These productive available man-hours are used to conduct both scheduled and unscheduled maintenance (Washabaugh, 2016, p. 1) . Unfortunately, too many distractors compete for time spent working on aircraft, among them details, additional duties, and training. The goal for soldier direct productive time in peacetime is 4.5 hours a day (Brooke, 1998, p. 4) , but studies have shown that aviation mechanics are typically available for productive "wrench turning" work only about 31 percent of an 8-hour peacetime day, which equates to under 3 hours per day (Kokenes, 1987, p. 12) . Finding the time to allow soldiers to do this maintenance in conjunction with other duties is a great challenge to aviation leaders at every level (McClellan, 1991, p. 31) , and it takes command emphasis to make it happen. Figure 1 summarizes the key factors that diminish the number of wrench turning hours available to soldier maintainers and contribute to the MMH gap. 
MMH Gap = Required MMHs -Available MMHs
Recently, "Boots on the Ground" (BOG) restrictions-designed to reduce domestic political risk-have constrained the number of soldiers we can deploy for combat operations (Robson, 2014, p. 2) . The decision is usually to maximize warfighters and minimize maintainers to get the most "Bang for the Buck." Despite the reduction in soldier maintainers, a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) is still expected to maintain and fly its roughly 100 aircraft (Gibbons-Neff, 2016, p. 1), driving a need to deploy contract maintainers to perform necessary aircraft maintenance functions (Judson, 2016, p. 1 (DoD, 2016) . Thus, any use of contract support has been and will be supplemental rather than a true outsourcing. Second, unlike the Navy and U.S. Air Force, the Army has not established a firm performance requirement to meet with a PBL vehicle, perhaps because the fleet(s) are owned and managed by the CABs. The aviation school at Fort Rucker, Alabama, is one exception to this, with the five airfields and fleets there managed by a contractor under a hybrid PBL contract vehicle. Third, the type of support provided by contractors across the world ranges from direct on-airfield maintenance to off-site port operations, downed aircraft recovery, depot repairs, installation of modifications, repainting of aircraft, etc. Recent experience with a hybrid PBL contract with multiple customers and sources of funding shows that managing the support of several contractors is very difficult. From 1995-2005, spare parts availability was a key determinant of maintenance turnaround times. But now, with over a decade of unlimited budgets for logistics, the issue of spare parts receded, at least temporarily. Currently maintenance turnaround times are driven primarily by: (a) available labor, (b) depot repairs, and (c) modifications installed concurrently with reset or phase maintenance. This article and the MMH Gap Calculator address only the total requirement for labor hours, not the cost or constraints in executing maintenance to a given schedule.
The Army is conducting a holistic review of Army aviation and this review will include an assessment of the level of contractor maintenance for Army aviation (McBride, 2016, p. 1). It's important to understand the level and mix of mission functions and purpose of contract maintainers in order to find the right balance between when soldiers or contract maintainers are used (Judson, 2016, p. 2) . A critical part of this assessment is understanding the actual size of the existing MMH gap. Unfortunately, there is no definitive approach for doing so, and every Army aviation unit estimates the difference between the required and available MMHs using its own unique heuristic or "rule of thumb" calculations, making it difficult to make an Army-wide assessment.
Being able to quantify the MMH gap will help inform the development of new or supplementary MTOEs that provide adequate soldier maintainers. Being able to examine the impact on the MMH gap of changing various nonmaintenance requirements will help commanders define more effective manpower management policies. Being able to determine an appropriate contract maintainer package to replace nondeployed soldier maintainers will help ensure mission success. To address these issues, the U.S. Army Program Executive Office (PEO), Aviation challenged us to develop a decision support tool for calculating the size of the MMH gap that could also support performing trade-off analyses like those mentioned earlier.
Approach and Methodology
Several attempts have been made to examine the MMH gap problem in the past, three of which are described in the discussion that follows.
McClellan conducted a manpower utilization analysis of his aviation unit to identify the amount of time his soldier maintainers spent performing nonmaintenance tasks. His results showed that his unit had the equivalent of 99 maintainers working daily when 196 maintainers were actually assigned-about a 51 percent availability factor (McClellan, 1991, p. 32) .
Swift conducted an analysis of his maintenance personnel to determine if his MTOE provided adequate soldier maintainers. He compared his unit's required MMH against the assigned MMH provided by his MTOE, which resulted in an annual MMH shortfall of 22,000 hours or 11 contactor manyear equivalents (CME). His analysis did not include the various distractors described earlier in this article so the actual MMH gap is probably higher (Swift, 2005, p. 2) . Even though his analysis was focused on vehicle maintenance, some of the same issues plague aviation maintenance.
Mead hypothesized that although more sophisticated aviation systems have been added to the fleet, the workforce to maintain those systems has not increased commensurately. He conducted an analysis of available MMH versus required MMH for the Army's UH-60 fleet and found MMH gaps for a number of specific aviation maintenance military occupational specialties during both peacetime and wartime (Mead, 2014, pp. 14-23) .
The methodology we used for developing our MMH Gap Calculator was to compare the MMH required of the CAB per month against the MMH available to the CAB per month and identify any shortfall. The approaches described previously followed this same relatively straightforward mathematical formula, but the novelty of our approach is that none of these other approaches brought all the pieces together to customize calculation of the MMH gap for specific situations or develop a decision support tool that examined the impact of manpower management decisions on the size of the MMH gap.
Our approach is consistent with Army R e g u l a t i o n 7 5 0 -1 , A r m y M a t e r i e l Maintenance Policy, which sets forth guidance on determining tactical maintenance augmentation requirements for military mechanics and leverages best practices from Army aviation unit "rule of thumb" MMH gap calculations. We coordinated with senior PEO Aviation, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), and CAB subject matter experts (SMEs) and extracted applicable data elements from the official MTOEs for light, medium, and heavy CAB configurations. Additionally, we incorporated approved Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) data and other official references (Table 1) , 
Validating the MMH Gap Calculator
Based on discussions with senior PEO Aviation, AMCOM, and CAB SMEs, we established four scenarios: (a) Army Doctrine, (b) Peacetime, (c) Wartime without BOG Constraint, and (d) Wartime with BOG Constraint. We adjusted the three levers described previously to reflect historical personnel MTOE fill rates, maintainer availability, and DLR for a heavy CAB under each scenario, and derived the following results:
• Army Doctrine. Using inputs of 90 percent Personnel MTOE Fill, 60 percent Availability, and 60 percent DLR, no MMH gap exists. Theoretically, a CAB does not need contractor support and can maintain its fleet of aircraft with only organic maintenance assets.
• Peacetime. Adjusting the inputs to historical peacetime CAB data (80 percent Personnel MTOE Fill, 50 percent Availability, and 60 percent DLR) indicates that a typical heavy CAB would require 43 CMEs to meet MMH requirements.
• Wartime, without BOG Constraint. Adjusting the inputs to typical Wartime CAB data without BOG Constraints (95 Personnel MTOE Fill, 80 percent Availability, and 65 percent DLR) indicates that a heavy CAB would require 84 CMEs to meet MMH requirements.
• Wartime, with BOG Constraint. Adjusting the inputs to typical Wartime CAB data with BOG Constraints (50 percent Personnel MTOE Fill, 80 percent Availability, and 75 percent DLR) indicates that a heavy CAB would require 222 CMEs to meet MMH requirements.
The lever settings and results of these scenarios are shown in Table 3 . Having served in multiple CABs, in both peacetime and wartime as maintenance officers at battalion, brigade, division, and Army levels, the SMEs considered the results shown in Table 3 to be consistent with current contractor augmentations and concluded that the MMH Gap Calculator is a valid solution to the problem stated earlier. To estimate lower and upper extremes of the current MMH gap, we ran peacetime and wartime scenarios for the current Active Army aviation force consisting of a mix of 13 CABs in heavy, medium, and light configurations (currently five heavy CABs, seven medium CABs, and one light CAB). The results of these runs at various MTOE fill rates are shown in Figure 3 .
The estimate of the peacetime MMH gap for the current 13-CAB configuration is based on: (a) 50 percent Availability, (b) 60 percent DLR, and (c) four levels of Personnel MTOE Fill, from 70 percent to 100 percent. As shown in Figure 3 , the peacetime MMH gap ranges from 36,999 to 151,323 MMH per month across the current 13-CAB configuration, depending on the Personnel MTOE fill rate. The number of CMEs needed to address this gap ranges from 215 to 880 CMEs, respectively.
The estimate of the wartime MMH gap for the current 13-CAB configuration is based on: (a) 80 percent Availability, (b) 65 percent DLR, and (c) four levels of Personnel MTOE Fill, from 70 percent to 100 percent. Figure 3 shows the wartime MMH gap ranges from 362,330 to 744,034 MMH per month across the current 13-CAB configuration, depending on the Personnel MTOE fill rate. The number of CMEs needed to address this gap ranges from 1,839 to 3,777 CMEs, respectively.
These CME requirements do not account for any additional program management support requirements. In addition, it is important to note that the MMH gaps presented in Figure 3 are not intended to promote any specific planning objective or strategy. Rather, these figures present realistic estimates of the MMH gap, pursuant to historically derived settings, OPTEMPO rates, and doctrinal/ regulatory guidance on maintainer availability factors and maintenance requirements. In subsequent reviews, SMEs validated the MMH gap estimates based on multiple deployments managing hundreds of thousands of flight hours during 25 to 35 years of service.
Quantifying the Future Aviation MMH Gap
To estimate the lower and upper extremes of the future MMH gap, we ran peacetime and wartime scenarios for the post-Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) Active Army aviation force consisting of 10 heavy CABs. These scenarios included an additional 45 maintainers per CAB, as proposed by the ARI. The results of these runs are shown in Figure 4 . The estimate of the peacetime MMH gap for the post-ARI 10-CAB configuration is based on: (a) 50 percent Availability, (b) 60 percent DLR, and (c) four levels of Personnel MTOE Fill, from 70 percent to 100 percent. As shown in Figure 4 , the peacetime MMH gap ranges from 0 to 88,140 MMH per month across the post-ARI 10 CAB configuration. The number of CMEs needed to address this gap ranges from 0 to 510 CMEs, respectively.
The estimate of the wartime MMH gap for the post-ARI 10-CAB configuration is based on: (a) 80 percent Availability, (b) 65 percent DLR, and (c) four levels of Personnel MTOE Fill, from 70 percent to 100 percent. Figure  4 shows the wartime MMH gap ranges from 124,520 to 448,600 MMH per month across the post-ARI 10-CAB configuration. The number of CMEs needed to address this gap ranges from 630 to 2,280 CMEs, respectively. As before, these CME requirements do not account for any additional program management support requirements.
Conclusions
First, the only scenario where no MMH gap occurs is under exact prescribed doctrinal conditions. In today's Army, this scenario is unlikely. Throughout the study, we found no other settings to support individual and collective aviation readiness requirements without long-term CME support during either Peacetime or Wartime OPTEMPOs. With the proposed ARI plus-up of 45 additional maintainers per CAB, the MMH gap is only partially addressed. A large MMH gap persists during wartime, even with a 100 percent MTOE fill rate and no BOG constraint, and during peacetime if the MTOE fill rate drops below 100 percent.
Second, the four main drivers behind the MMH gap are OPTEMPO, Personnel MTOE fill rate, Availability rate, and DLR rate. The CAB may be able to control the last two drivers by changing management strategies or prioritizing maintenance over nonmaintenance tasks. Unfortunately, the CAB is unable to control the first two drivers.
Finally, the only real short-term solution is continued CME or Department of Army Civilian maintainer support to fill the ever-present gap. These large MMH gaps in any configuration increase risk to unit readiness, aircraft availability, and the CAB's ability to provide mission-capable aircraft. Quick and easy doctrinal solutions to fill any MMH gap do not exist. The Army can improve soldier technical skills, lower the OPTEMPO, increase maintenance staffing, or use contract maintenance support to address this gap. Adding more soldier training time may increase future DLRs, but will lower current available MMH and exacerbate the problem in the short term. Reducing peacetime OPTEMPO may lower the number of required MMHs, but could result in pilots unable to meet required training hours to maintain qualification levels. Increasing staffing levels is difficult in a downsizing force. Thus, making use of contractor support to augment organic CAB maintenance assets appears to be a very reasonable approach.
Recommendations
First, the most feasible option to fill the persistent, now documented MMH gap is to continue using contract maintainers. With centrally managed contract support, efficiencies are gained through unity of effort providing one standard for airworthiness, quality, and safety unique to Army aviation. The challenge with using contractors is to identify the The only scenario where no MMH gap occurs is under exact prescribed doctrinal conditions. In today's Army, this scenario is unlikely.
appropriate number of support contractors and program management costs. Results of this MMH Gap Calculator can help each CAB and the Army achieve the appropriate mix of soldier maintainers and contractor support.
Second, to standardize the calculation of annual MMH gaps and support requirements, the Army should adopt a standardized approach like our MMH Gap Calculator, and continuously improve planning and management of both soldier and contractor aviation maintenance at the CAB and division level.
Third and finally, the MMH Gap Calculator should be used to perform various trade-off analyses. Aviation leaders can leverage the tool to project the impacts of proposed MMH mitigation strategies so they can modify policies and procedures to maximize their available MMH. The Training and Doctrine Command can leverage the tool to help meet Design for Maintenance goals, improve maintenance management training, and inform MTOE development. The Army can leverage the tool to determine the size of the contractor package needed to support a deployed unit under BOG constraints.
Our MMH Gap Calculator should also be adapted to other units and maintenance-intensive systems and operations, including ground units and nontactical units. While costs are not incorporated in the current version of the MMH Gap Calculator, we are working to include costs to support budget exercises to examine the MMH gap-cost tradeoff.
